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Abstract
Existing studies assume that the impact of democracy on FDI is the same for re-
source exporting and non-resource exporting countries. This paper examines whether
natural resources alter the relationship between FDI and democracy. We estimate a
linear dynamic panel-data model using data from 112 developing countries over the
period 1982-2007, and we ￿nd that there is some critical value of the share of miner-
als and oil in total exports below which democracy enhances FDI, and above which
democracy reduces FDI. We identify 90 countries where an expansion of democracy
may enhance FDI and 22 countries where an increase in democratization may reduce
FDI.
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In the past two decades, there has been a signi￿cant shift in the attitude towards foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) to developing countries. Speci￿cally, the discussion among academics
and policymakers has shifted from whether FDI should be encouraged to how developing
countries can attract FDI. Indeed many international development agencies, such as the
World Bank, consider FDI as one of the most e⁄ective tools in the global ￿ght against
poverty, and therefore actively encourage poor countries to pursue policies that will enhance
FDI ￿ ows.1 However, many of the countries that want to attract FDI also have weak democ-
racies or nondemocratic governments. It is therefore important to understand the e⁄ect of
democratization on FDI. For example, if democracy deters FDI, then countries face a trade
o⁄ ￿ between increased democratization and attracting more FDI.
This paper answers three questions: (i) Does democracy facilitate FDI?; (ii) Do natural
resources alter the relationship between FDI and democracy?; and (iii) Do foreign direct
investors prefer less democracy when they operate in natural resource exporting countries?
Answers to these questions cannot be discerned from theory because the theoretical impact
of democracy on FDI is unclear.2 On the one hand, democratic institutions may have a
positive e⁄ect on FDI because democracy provides checks and balances on elected o¢ cials,
and this in turn reduces arbitrary government intervention, lowers the risk of policy reversal
and strengthens property right protection (North and Weingast, 1989; Li 2009).3 On the
other hand, multinational corporations (MNCs) may prefer to invest in autocratic countries.
One reason is that unlike a democracy, autocratic governments are not accountable to their
electorates. As a consequence, autocratic governments may be in a better position to provide
more generous incentive packages and also o⁄er protection from labor unions (Li and Resnick,
2003). In addition, it is easier for MNCs to exploit their oligopolistic or monopolistic positions
when they operate in autocratic countries (Li and Resnick, 2003). Thus, the overall e⁄ect
of democracy on FDI has to be determined empirically.
There is a vast empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, however, only a few of
the studies include democracy as an explanatory variable. Our extensive literature review
revealed that the empirical research on FDI and democracy is scant and also recent. We
1For example, the key function of the World Bank￿ s Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency (MIGA)
is to facilitate FDI to poor countries. Also, the United Nations millennium declaration stipulates that an
increase in FDI to developing countries will result in a signi￿cant reduction in global poverty rates.
2See Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen (2003) for a detailed discussion about the theoretical impact of
democracy on FDI.
3Due to the irreversible nature of FDI, the risk of policy reversal (e.g., changes in tax laws, royalty fees,
etc) has a profound adverse impact on FDI. Li (2009) argues that democratic regimes are less likely to
expropriate FDI than autocratic governments. He documents that between 1960 and 1990 there were 520
incidents of expropriation, and autocratic governments were responsible for about 423 of these incidents.
1found only twelve published articles which included democracy as a determinant of FDI, and
only two of the papers were published before 2000. Eight of the studies found a positive and
signi￿cant relationship between democracy and FDI, three found no signi￿cant e⁄ect, and
only one study found a negative e⁄ect.4 The existing studies have several limitations. First,
there is the issue of reverse causality: the relationship between FDI and democracy may be
bidirectional.5 Second, the measure of democracy is likely to exhibit measurement errors.
Third, there is the problem of an omitted variable bias. For example, only four papers
included natural resources as an explanatory variable in their regressions.6 As we show
in Section 5, natural resources has a causal e⁄ect on FDI. These three potential problems
suggest that endogeneity may be a concern. Yet, none of the existing studies address this
potential endogeneity problem. Another limitation is that most of the papers do not take into
account the persistent nature of FDI. Furthermore, eleven out of the twelve papers employed
ordinary least squares (OLS) or ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) estimations. One of the advantages of
the FE estimator is that it mitigates some of the biases associated with OLS. However,
the possible endogeneity of democracy, the short time periods of the panel data, and the
persistent nature of FDI suggest that the FE estimator is likely to produce inconsistent and
biased estimates. One more caveat of the existing literature is that all the studies assume
that the e⁄ect of democracy on FDI is the same for resource exporting and non-resource
exporting countries. This assumption seems inconsistent with the data.
Figures 1a-3b show the association between FDI and three measures of democracy for
87 developing countries. The democracy measures, free, polity and icrg are from three
di⁄erent sources: Freedom House, Polity IV and the International Country Risk Guide,
respectively (we provide more details in Section 3). The countries are grouped according to
their natural resource export intensity: Group 1 comprise of countries where the share of the
sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports averaged over the period 1982-2007,
denoted by nat, is less than 50%, and Group 2 consist of countries where nat ￿ 50%. For the
4Rodrik (1996), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003), Busse (2004), Jakobsen (2006), Jakobsen
and de Soysa (2006), Adam and Filippaios (2007), and Busse and Hefeker (2007) found a positive e⁄ect; Li
and Resnick (2003) found a negative e⁄ect; Oneal (1994), Alesina and Dollar (2000), and Buthe and Milner
(2008) did not ￿nd a signi￿cant relationship between democracy and FDI. See Asiedu and Lien (2010) for a
review of the literature.
5Li and Reuveny (2003) ￿nd that FDI has a positive e⁄ect on democracy and Dutta and Roy (2009) ￿nd
that FDI has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on press freedom.
6The discussion of natural resources in these papers was cursory. Speci￿cally, Jakobsen and de Soysa
(2006) and Jakobsen (2006) reported that the estimated coe¢ cient of the natural resource variable was
not signi￿cant, and therefore did not include the natural resource variable in the estimations reported in
the paper. Busse (2004) included natural resources in only one regression. Harms and Ursprung (2002)
de￿ned natural resource availability as a dummy that takes on value one if a country is a net exporter of
oil throughout the 1990s and zero otherwise. Since natural resource is de￿ned as a dummy variable, the
variable was excluded in the ￿xed e⁄ects regressions.
2countries in Group 1, FDI seems to be positively associated with democracy for all the three
measures of democracy (￿gures 1a, 2a and 3a). This contrasts with the Group 2 countries,
where democracy seems to be negatively correlated with FDI (￿gure 3b) or uncorrelated
with FDI (￿gures 1b and 2b). Thus, the data suggest that foreign direct investors prefer
democratic governments when they operate in non-resource exporting countries, but prefer
less democratic or nondemocratic governments when they operate in resource exporting
countries. The relevance of natural resources in determing the relationhsip between FDI
and democracy is also consistent with the results of the 2007 global survey conducted by
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), where 44% of ￿rms in extractive industries reported
that democracy was important to their investment decisions, compared with 52% for all the
￿rms surveyed (EIU, 2008).
This paper reassesses the relationship between democracy and FDI. We estimate a dy-
namic panel data model where we interact the measure of democracy with the share of the
sum of minerals and fuel in total merchandise exports, nat. Our analyses utilize a panel
data of 112 developing countries over the period 1982-2007. We employ three measures
of democracy from three di⁄erent sources and we utilize two estimation techniques￿ the
dynamic panel ￿Di⁄erence￿ General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991), and the ￿System￿GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1998). We ￿nd that there is some critical value of nat below which democracy en-
hances FDI, and above which democracy reduces FDI. We identify 90 countries where an
expansion of democracy may enhance FDI, and 22 countries where an increase in democ-
ratization may reduce FDI. We disaggregate the measure of natural resources into its two
components ￿ fuel as a share of exports and minerals as a share of exports ￿ and ￿nd
that the relationship between FDI and democracy depends on the ￿size￿and not the ￿type￿
of natural resources. Finally, we show that our results are robust: they hold for di⁄erent
estimation procedures, alternative measures of democracy, di⁄erent sub-samples, di⁄erent
time periods, when we control for FDI risk, institutional quality, political risk, and when we
take into account the endogeneity of natural resources and democracy. In all the regressions,
we control for macroeconomic instability, market size, openness to trade and infrastructure
development in host countries.
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge
this is the ￿rst study to analyze the interaction e⁄ect of natural resources and democracy on
FDI. Second, the estimation techniques that we employ ameliorate some of the econometric
problems that plague previous studies. Speci￿cally, the estimators account for unobserved
country-speci￿c e⁄ects, mitigate any potential endogeneity problems, permit the inclusion
of lagged dependent variables as well as endogenous explanatory variables, and also accom-
3modate panel data with short time periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides plausible reasons
why natural resources may alter the relationship between FDI and democracy. Section 3
describes the data and the variables, Section 4 discusses the estimation procedure, Sections
5 and 6 present the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Why Natural Resources may alter the Relationship
between Democracy and FDI
We provide four plausible reasons. First, in most developing countries, investment restric-
tions and government intervention are more prevalent in extractive industries than in other
industries. For example in Nigeria and Tanzania, 100% foreign ownership is allowed in all
sectors with the exception of the petroleum sector. When government regulations are exten-
sive, it is more convenient for MNCs to operate under a political regime where power is more
centralized and concentrated in the hands of one individual or a small group of individuals.7
Second, typically, regulations that cover FDI in extractive industries are fuzzy and the in-
terpretation of the rules is at the discretion of top government o¢ cials. A good example is
Botswana where taxation and government ownership share in diamond mining are subject
to case-by-case negotiations, and the minister has power to remit or defer royalty on these
investment. In such situations, a change in government e⁄ectively implies a change in a
country￿ s investment framework, which in turn implies an unstable policy environment. A
stable policy environment is particularly important to MNCs in extractive industries because
the exploration and extraction of minerals involve an initial large-scale capital intensive in-
vestment (i.e., sunk cost), a high degree of uncertainty and long gestation periods.8 Thus,
to the extent that longevity of government implies a more stable and predictable business
environment, democratic regimes are less preferable because democracies are typically as-
sociated with a frequent change of government o¢ cials. The view that autocratic regimes
7Consider an extreme case such as a dictatorship. Here, the MNC may need the approval of only one
top government o¢ cial in order to authenticate the ￿rms￿operations. Furthermore, if the MNC is successful
in lobbying the o¢ cial, the ￿rms￿e⁄orts are almost guaranteed to produce results. In contrast, democratic
institutions typically work on consensus, power is more di⁄used and the legislature is controlled by multiple
groups. As a consequence, more resources and time are spent on lobbying e⁄orts. Moreover, the outcome of
the lobbying e⁄orts is less predictable.
8The relative importance of a stable policy environment for MNCs in the primary sector is noted in the
EIU (2008) survey. In the survey, MNCs in the primary sector indicated that ￿a stable and business-friendly
environment￿is the second (out of twelve) most important location criterion (the most important factor is
access to natural resources). In contrast a stable policy environment ranked nine out of twelve for MNCs in
manufacturing, and seven out of twelve for MNCs in the services sector. The two most important location
factors for MNCs in services and manufacturing are the size of local markets and the growth of markets.
4provide a more stable business environment is consistent with the EIU survey results where
about 62% of the respondents agreed with the statement that authoritarian regimes pro-
vide a more stable and predictable business environment. The third plausible explanation
is that in many resource exporting countries, MNCs in extractive industries are prohibited
from forming wholly-owned subsidiaries, and are often required to share ownership with the
government (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). Naturally, an MNC will prefer to have a stable
joint venture partner, and this is less likely to occur under a regime where the government in
power changes every few years, such as in a democracy. Finally, we note that FDI in extrac-
tive industries is mainly driven by access to natural resources in host countries. However,
natural resources are considered to be of strategic, political and ￿nancial importance to host
countries and are therefore tightly controlled by the government. Thus, having close ties
with the government may imply gaining access to an invaluable production input. Clearly,
such relationships are easier to foster under autocratic regimes.
3 The Data and the Variables
Our empirical analyses utilize panel data of 112 developing countries over the period 1982-
2007 (see the appendix for the list of countries). As it is standard in the literature, our
dependent variable is net FDI=GDP and we average the data over four years to smooth out
cyclical ￿ uctuations. The descriptive statistics of the variables is reported in Table1.
3.1 Democracy
There are many sources that provide ratings on the level of democratization in various
countries. As expected, none of the measures of democracy is perfect. For example, Poe
and Tate (1994) argue that the Freedom House data on civil and political liberties, which
are one of the most utilized data in the profession, are biased in favor of Christian nations
and Western democracies. Casper and Tu￿s (2003) also caution that di⁄erent measures
of democracy, even when highly correlated, may not be interchangeable because they may
produce di⁄erent results. Therefore in order to increase the credibility of our results, we
employ three di⁄erent measures of democracy from three di⁄erent sources for our benchmark
regressions.
The ￿rst measure of democracy, free, is derived from the data on political rights pub-
lished by Freedom House. The data ranges from one to seven. A rating of one implies ￿there
are competitive parties or other political groupings, the opposition plays an important role
and has actual power￿and a rating of seven indicates that political rights are absent. The
second measure, polity, is derived from the democracy index published in Polity IV, and
5it re￿ ects the openness and the competitiveness of the political process as well as the pres-
ence of institutions that allows political participation. The index ranges from zero to ten,
where a higher rating implies higher levels of democracy. The third measure, icrg, is the
measure of democracy published in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data
are published by Political Risk Services, and it re￿ ects the extent to which elections are free
and fair, and the degree to which the government is accountable to its electorate. The data
ranges from one to six, a higher score implies more democracy and accountability. To ease
comparison between the di⁄erent measures of democracy, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2008)
and normalize free, polity and icrg to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number
implies more democracy. The three measures of democracy vary in terms of coverage and
availability. The regressions that employ free as a measure of democracy have up to 652
observations and covers 112 countries, polity has 614 observations and covers 102 countries,
and icrg has 551 observations and it covers only 87 countries. The ICRG data are targeted
toward foreign investors and as a consequence, the data are not available for many small
or poor countries, or for countries that receive very little FDI. Furthermore, many of the
countries in our sample for which the ICRG data is missing have high FDI=GDP relative
to the mean. This clearly generates a potential sample selection problem.
3.2 Natural Resources
We employ three measures of natural resources to capture a country￿ s natural resource export
intensity: (i) The share of fuel in total merchandise exports, fe; (ii) The share of minerals in
total merchandise exports, me; and (iii) The share of fuel and minerals in total merchandise
exports, nat, where nat = me + fe. We use these measures for three reasons. First, they
provide an indication of the type of FDI that goes to a country. For example, oil exporting
countries are likely to have FDI concentrated in the oil sector. Second, the measures re￿ ect
the importance of natural resources to the host country. Such information is important in
explaining our main result, that foreign direct investors may prefer less democracy in natural
resource exporting countries. Third, the measures have been employed in several studies and
also the data are readily available.9
We hypothesize a negative association between natural resources and FDI for the fol-
lowing three reasons. The ￿rst reason is based on the idea that resource booms lead to an
appreciation of local currency. This makes the country￿ s exports less competitive at world
prices, and thereby crowds out investments in non-natural resource tradable sectors. If the
crowding out is more than one-for-one, it may lead to an overall decline in FDI. The second
9Alternative measures of natural resources, for example measures that re￿ ect natural resource abundance
lack these three attributes.
6reason is that natural resources, in particular oil, are characterized by booms and busts,
leading to increased volatility in the exchange rate (Sachs and Warner, 1995). In addition,
a higher share of fuel and minerals in total merchandise exports implies less trade diversi￿-
cation, which in turn makes a country more vulnerable to external shocks. All these factors
generate macroeconomic instability and therefore reduce FDI. Finally, FDI in natural re-
source rich countries tend to be concentrated in the natural resource sector. While natural
resource exploration requires a large initial capital outlay, the continuing operations demand
a small cash ￿ ow. Thus, after the initial phase, FDI may be staggered.
3.3 Other Variables
Control Variables: Following the literature on the determinants of FDI, we include the
following variables in our regressions. We use trade=GDP as a measure of openness and the
rate of in￿ ation as a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. We employ two measures to
capture the level of infrastructure development in host countries: (i) the number of telephones
per 100 population; and (ii) gross ￿xed capital formation as a share of GDP.10 All else equal,
openness to trade, lower in￿ ation and a better physical infrastructure should have a positive
e⁄ect on FDI. Higher domestic incomes imply a greater demand for goods and services and
therefore make the host country more attractive for FDI. Asiedu and Lien (2003) ￿nd that
domestic income has to achieve a certain threshold in order to facilitate FDI ￿ ows. Thus,
following Asiedu and Lien (2003), we include both GDP per capita and the square of GDP
per capita in our regressions.
Robustness Variables: The robustness regressions employ data on measures of insti-
tutional quality, political instability and FDI risk in host countries. As pointed out in the
introduction, democracies are generally associated with better institutions, such as private
property protection and better enforcement of laws and regulations. Thus, it is possible that
our measures of democracy are not capturing the ￿true￿level of democratization in FDI
host countries, but rather the measures are a proxy for the quality of institutions in these
countries. If that is the case, then our results are driven by institutional quality and not by
democracy. We attempt to capture the ￿pure￿e⁄ect of democracy on FDI by controlling for
institutional quality in host countries. We consider three measures of institutional quality
which re￿ ect (i) corruption (ii) the impartiality of the legal system; and (iii) bureaucratic
quality in host countries. We also note that democracy does not necessarily imply politi-
cal stability. For example, riots and assassinations can occur even in a democratic country
10Gross ￿xed capital formation includes funds spent on the construction of roads, railways, schools, com-
mercial and industrial buildings and land improvements.
7(Bollen and Jackman, 1989). We consider two measures of political instability which re￿ ect:
(i) the level of internal and external con￿ ict; and (ii) the stability of the government in power.
Finally, we include a variable that captures the risk to investment as a result of ￿hostile￿
government actions (e.g., expropriation) and restrictions on FDI. We did not include these
variables in our benchmark regressions because the data are from the ICRG and are available
for a limited number of countries. Speci￿cally, the number of countries drop from 112 to 87,
and the number of observations decrease from 652 to 551.
4 Estimation Procedure
We estimate a linear dynamic panel-data (DPD) model to capture the e⁄ect of lagged FDI
on current FDI. DPD models contain unobserved panel-level e⁄ects that are correlated with
the lagged dependent variable, and this renders standard estimators inconsistent. The GMM
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides consistent estimates for such mod-
els. This estimator often referred to as the ￿di⁄erence￿GMM estimator di⁄erences the data
￿rst and then uses lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. However, as
pointed out by Arellano and Bover (1995), lagged levels are often poor instruments for ￿rst
di⁄erences. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed a more e¢ cient estimator, the ￿system￿
GMM estimator, which mitigates the poor instruments problem by using additional moment
conditions. However, the system estimator has one disadvantage: it utilizes too many instru-
ments. Thus, the di⁄erence estimator su⁄ers from the ￿weak￿instruments problem and the
system estimator exhibits the ￿too many￿instruments problem (Hayakawa, 2007). Indeed,
as shown by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Bobba and Coviello (2007), the two estimation pro-
cedures can produce strikingly di⁄erent results.11 Thus, in order to increase the credibility
of our results, we report the estimations for both the di⁄erence and system estimators.
Now, the two estimation procedures assume that there is no autocorrelation in the idio-
syncratic errors. Hence, for each regression, we test for autocorrelation and the validity of
the instruments. Speci￿cally, we report the p-values for the test for second order autocor-
relation as well as the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions. These tests, however,
lose power when the number of instruments, i, is large relative to the cross section sample
size (in our case, the number of countries), n￿ in particular when the instrument ratio, r,
de￿ned as r = n=i < 1 (Roodman, 2007; Stata, 2009). Thus, when r < 1, the assumptions
underlying the two procedures may be violated. Furthermore, a lower r raises the suscepti-
11Acemoglu et. al. (2005) used the Arellano and Bond di⁄erence estimator to show that education does
not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on democracy. However, Bobba and Coviello (2007) employed the Blundell and
Bond system estimator and found that education has a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on democracy.
8bility of the estimates to a Type 1 error￿ i.e., producing signi￿cant results even though there
is no underlying association between the variables involved (Roodman, 2007). The easiest
solution to this problem is to reduce the instrument count by limiting the number of lagged
levels to be included as instruments (Roodman, 2007; Stata, 2009). In all the 18 benchmark
regressions and in 27 out of the 38 robustness regressions, r ￿ 1, and therefore we do not
restrict the number of lags of the dependent variable used for instrumentation. For the 11
cases where r < 1, we limit the number of lagged levels to be included as instruments to
the point where r ￿ 1, and we check whether our results are robust to the reduction in
instrument count.
We end the section by providing some details about our estimation strategy.12 First, we
use the two-step GMM estimator, which is asymptotically e¢ cient and robust to all kinds
of heteroskedasticity. Second, the independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous
in all the regressions, with the exception of four robustness regressions where democracy
and natural resources are considered to be endogenous. Third, our regressions utilize only
internal instruments￿ we do not include additional (external) instruments. Speci￿cally, both
the di⁄erence and system estimators use the ￿rst di⁄erence of all the exogenous variables as
standard instruments, and the lags of the endogenous variables to generate the GMM-type
instruments described in Arellano and Bond (1991). Furthermore, the system estimations
include lagged di⁄erences of the endogenous variables as instruments for the level equation,
but the di⁄erence estimations do not.
5 Benchmark Regressions
We estimate the equation:
fdiit = ￿demit + ￿natit + ￿natit ￿ demit + ￿fdiit￿1
+￿
J
j=1￿jZjit + ￿i + "it (1)
where i refers to countries, t to time, ￿i is the country-speci￿c e⁄ect, fdi is net FDI=GDP,
dem is a measure of democracy, nat is a measure of natural resource export intensity, nat￿
dem is the interaction term, and Z is a vector of control variables.
(i) Does democracy have a direct e⁄ect on FDI?
To answer this question we estimate equation (1) without the interaction term, nat￿dem.
The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient of dem, ￿. The results are reported in Table 2.
Note that b ￿ is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the regressions, suggesting that
12We used Stata 10 for our regressions. The discussion below draws heavily from Stata (2009).
9all else equal, democracy facilitates FDI ￿ ows. We use an example to illustrate the positive
e⁄ect of democracy on FDI. Consider two countries in the same sub-region in SSA that have
extremely di⁄erent levels of democratization ￿ Swaziland, the least democratic country in
Southern Africa and Mauritius, the country with the highest democracy score. Then the
regressions that employ the measure of democracy, free, shows that an improvement in
democracy from the level of Swaziland (free = 0:06) to the level of Mauritius (free = 0:98)
will increase fdi by about 1:49 percentage points for the di⁄erence regression [@fdi=@dem =
1:616 ￿ (0:98 ￿ 0:06) ￿ 1:49] and about 0:94 percentage points for the system regression
[@fdi=@dem = 1:020 ￿ (0:98 ￿ 0:06) ￿ 0:94]. The increase in fdi is economically important
because the average annual increase in fdi to Swaziland, over the period 1984-2007 was
about 0:28 percentage points.
We now turn our attention to the other variables. Natural resource export intensity has
an adverse e⁄ect on FDI; openness to trade, good infrastructure and less in￿ ation promote
FDI; and GDP per capita has a positive impact on FDI only if income per capita exceeds
a certain threshold. The estimated coe¢ cient of lagged fdi, b ￿, is negative, suggesting that
current fdi is negatively correlated with future fdi. Note that a one unit increase in the
level of current democracy on current fdi is equal to b ￿, and the long run e⁄ect on fdi is
b ￿
1￿b ￿. Since b ￿ > b ￿
1￿b ￿, this result implies that past levels of democratization has an impact on
current and future fdi ￿ ows, however, the e⁄ect subsides over time.
(ii) Do natural resources undermine the positive e⁄ect of democracy on FDI?
We estimate equation (1). Now, @fdi=@dem = ￿+￿￿nat, and therefore the parameters
of interest are ￿ and ￿. To conserve on space we report only the values of b ￿ and b ￿ in Table
3. The full estimation results are available in the supplementary ￿le. In all the regressions,
b ￿ > 0 and signi￿cant at the 1% level, and b ￿ < 0 and signi￿cant at the 1% level. This
suggests natural resources signi￿cantly alter the relationship between FDI by reducing the
positive e⁄ect of democracy on FDI. To elucidate our results, we evaluate the estimated
value of @fdi=@dem at reasonable values of nat. Speci￿cally, for each country, we calculate
the average value of nat over the period 1982-2007, which we denote by nat, and evaluate
@fdi=@dem at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentile and the mean of nat. The 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th, 90th percentile and the mean of nat correspond to the average value of nat for
Mauritius, Thailand, Ukraine, Indonesia, Syria and Belarus, respectively. The results are
reported in Table 4. Note that @fdi=@dem drops substantially as nat increases from the 10th
to the 75th percentile of nat. For the di⁄erence GMM estimations, the decline in @fdi=@dem
is about 83% for the regression using free, 82% for polity, and 81% for icrg; and for the
system estimations, @fdi=@dem decreases by about 83%, 82% and 81% for free, polity and
icrg, respectively. This indicates that natural resources drastically reduces the e⁄ectiveness
10of democracy in promoting FDI.
(iii) Can natural resources completely neutralize the positive e⁄ect of democ-
racy on FDI?
As shown in Table 4, the estimated value of @fdi=@dem is positive and signi￿cant, up to
the 75th percentile of nat, suggesting that democracy has a positive e⁄ect on FDI for at least
three quarters of the countries in the sample. However, the estimated value of @fdi=@dem
loses signi￿cance or turns negative and signi￿cant when evaluated at the 90th percentile of
nat, an indication that for at least 10% of the countries in our sample, democracy has no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI or has a negative e⁄ect.
(iv) Which countries may bene￿t from an improvement in democratization
and which countries may not?
To answer this question, we categorize our sample countries into two: Category A refer
to countries where an expansion in democratic rights may promote FDI, and Category B
comprise of countries where an increase in democracy may not result in an increase in FDI,
and may possibly reduce FDI. We now attempt to identify the countries in the two categories.
We ￿rst note that b ￿ > 0 and b ￿ < 0, implying that there exists a critical value of nat, nat￿,
such that @fdi=@dem = b ￿ + b ￿ ￿ nat￿ = 0. This implies that @fdi=@dem > 0 if and only if
nat < nat￿, suggesting that countries for which nat < nat￿ fall in Category A and countries
for which nat ￿ nat￿ fall in Category B. In classifying the countries, we compare each
country￿ s nat (i.e., the value of nat averaged over the period 1982-2007) with nat￿. Note
that each of the six regressions will produce a di⁄erent value of nat￿.13 Our selection criteria
is based on the median value of nat￿, which is approximately equal to 52%. Thus, countries
for which nat < 52% fall in Category A and the remaining countries fall in Category B. There
are 90 countries in Category A (about 80% of the countries in the sample) and 22 countries in
Category B. Note that @fdi=@dem ￿ 0 for the Category B countries, suggesting that all else
equal, foreign direct investors may prefer less democratic governments in these 22 countries.
The countries are Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Chile, Congo Republic, Gabon, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Seychelles,
Syria, Trinidad, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.14
(v) Does the e⁄ect of democracy on FDI depend on the type of natural
resource?
Recall that nat = fe + me, where fe is the share of fuel in total merchandise exports
and me is the share of metals and ore in total merchandise exports. Boschini et al. (2007)
13The values of nat￿for the di⁄erence regressions are 65, 50 and 56 for free, polity and icrg, respectively;
and the values for the system regressions are 51, 52 and 51, for free, polity and icrg, respectively.
14A word of caution is that the classi￿cation of the countries is not clear cut and is based on the GMM
estimate of nat￿, which is a random variable.
11￿nd that di⁄erent types of natural resources have di⁄erent e⁄ects on economic growth.
Thus, a question that comes to bear is whether the type of natural resources is relevant in
determining the e⁄ect of democracy on FDI. For example, Zambia and Nigeria are resource
intensive countries. However, Zambia￿ s exports are concentrated in hard minerals (2% oil
and 87% minerals) whereas Nigeria￿ s exports are mainly in oil (96% oil and 0:03% minerals).
Is the partial e⁄ect of democracy on FDI for these two countries statistically di⁄erent? We
re-estimate equation (1) where we use fe and me as measures of natural resources, i.e.,
fdiit = ￿fdii;t￿1 + ￿demit + ￿1feit + ￿2meit
+￿1feit ￿ demit + ￿2meit ￿ demit + ￿
J
j=1￿jZjit + ￿i + "it (2)
Here, @fdi=@dem = ￿ + ￿1 ￿ fe + ￿2 ￿ me. The values of b ￿, c ￿1and c ￿2 are reported
in Table 5. Note that b ￿ is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level, and c ￿1 and c ￿2 are
negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the regressions. This suggests that both oil
and minerals undermine the positive e⁄ect of democracy on FDI. We now determine whether
the interaction e⁄ect of democracy and natural resources on FDI is signi￿cantly di⁄erent for
fuel and minerals. Here, we test the hypothesis H0: ￿1 = ￿2. As shown in Table 5, we refuse
to reject H0 in ￿ve out of the six regressions. Our results therefore suggest that overall, the
type and the composition of resource intensity are not relevant in determining the interaction
e⁄ect of democracy and natural resources on FDI.
6 Robustness Regressions
In order to have a reasonable sample size, the robustness estimations employ the measure of
democracy that has the highest number of observations, i.e., free. Furthermore, to keep the
discussion focused and also conserve on space, we report a summary of the results in Tables
6, 7 and 8. The full estimation results are available in the supplementary ￿le. Below, we
provide a brief discussion of the robustness estimations.
(i) Sub-samples: According to Blonigen and Wang (2005), the determinants of FDI
to poor countries are di⁄erent from the determinants of FDI to more developed economies.
Asiedu (2002) also ￿nds that the factors that drive FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are
di⁄erent from the factors that drive FDI to other developing countries. We therefore run
separate regressions for middle income, low income, SSA and non-SSA countries. We also
note that our results may be driven by the extensive political transformation that took place
in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. We examine this hypothesis by running regressions where
we exclude Transition countries.
12The number of countries for the middle income, low income and SSA samples are small,
and as a consequence, the intrument ratio, r < 1. For these samples, we check whether the
result are robust to a reduction in instrument count, i.e., when we limit the instrument count
such that r > 1. In Panel A of Table 6, we report the values of b ￿ and b ￿ for r < 1 as well as
r > 1. Clearly, the results are robust: b ￿ and b ￿ are signi￿cant at least at the 5% level in 14
out of the 16 regressions.
(ii) Di⁄erent Time Periods: It is possible that our result is driven by the global
expansion of democracy that began in the 1990s, in particular, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample into two sub-periods:
1982-1991 and 1992-2007. Now, we con￿ned the benchmark regressions to the period 1982-
2007 in order to facilitate comparison between the three measures of democracy. The reason
is that the icrg data are not available prior to 1982. A relevant question is whether our
results hold when we include data from the 1970s, i.e., the period 1970-2007. As shown in
Panel B, b ￿ and b ￿ are signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the six regressions.
(iii) Alternative Measures of Democracy: The de￿nitions of free, polity and icrg
are di⁄erent, suggesting that the information in these indicators is not identical. However,
the democracy variables are highly correlated and the coe¢ cients are signi￿cant at the 1%
level, suggesting that there is a high degree of commonality between the variables.15 We run
a factor analysis on free, policy and icrg and use the principal component as a measure of
democracy. We also compute the average of free, polity and icrg and use that as proxy for
the overall level of democratization in the host country. Panel C shows that our results are
robust to the alternative measures of democracy: b ￿ and b ￿ are signi￿cant at the 1% level in
all the four regressions.
(iv) Time Fixed E⁄ects and Alternative Measure for the Dependent Variable:
The benchmark regressions do not include time ￿xed e⁄ects. One reason for including time
￿xed e⁄ects is to expunge the e⁄ect of business cycles. However, including time dummies
increases the number of instruments employed in the regressions, and this in turn weakens
the reliability of the empirical results. As it is standard in the literature, we averaged the
FDI data over four years to smooth out cyclical ￿ uctuations. We however, test whether our
results hold when we include time ￿xed e⁄ects.
Note that one could use FDI per capita as a dependent variable to analyze the e⁄ect
of democracy on FDI ￿ ows. We used an alternative measure, FDI=GDP for the following
reasons. First, the studies on the determinants of FDI typically employ FDI=GDP as
dependent variable. Second, the data on FDI=GDP has a wider coverage. For example
15The correlation coe¢ cient, ￿, is = 0:89 for free and polity, 0:68 for icrg and free, and 0:64 for polity
and icrg.
13the number of observations drop by about 20% (from 650 to 520) when we employ FDI
per capita as dependent variable. We note that the e⁄ect of democracy on FDI=GDP
might re￿ ect the impact of democracy on FDI, on GDP or both FDI and GDP. Thus,
we examine whether our results hold when we use FDI per capita as the dependent variable.
Panel D shows that b ￿ and b ￿ are signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the four regressions.
(v) FDI Risk, Quality of Institutions and Political Risk: The results are reported
in Table 7. We considered two speci￿cations. Speci￿cally, we run regressions where we
included the measures of FDI risk, institutional quality and Political Risk one at a time
(Columns 1-3 and 5-7), and another where we included all the variables (Columns 4 and
8). The results are robust: b ￿ is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level and b ￿ is negative
and signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the regressions. In addition, the magnitudes of b ￿ and
b ￿ are fairly stable across speci￿cations. With regards to the robustness variables, we found
that overall, FDI risk, high levels of bureaucracy, and an ine⁄ective legal system impede
FDI ￿ ows. The e⁄ect of political instability on FDI is puzzling. Speci￿cally, the estimated
coe¢ cient of the con￿ ict variable, conflict, and the measure of instability of government,
govstab, are signi￿cant at the 1% level in all the regressions, but have opposite signs: the
coe¢ cient of conflict is positive (wrong sign) and the coe¢ cient of govstab is negative. The
results persist even when conflict and govstab are included one at a time. Corruption did
not display a consistent relationship with FDI.
(vi) Endogeneity of Democracy and Natural Resources: As pointed out in the
introduction, democracy could be endogenous. Also, there is a potential endogeneity prob-
lem associated with our measure of natural resources. Speci￿cally, it is possible that an
unobserved variable may a⁄ect both FDI and exports. Since we measure natural resources
as a share of exports, it is possible that our estimates are biased. The di⁄erence and the
system estimators mitigate the endogeneity problem. However, in order to be thorough, we
address this issue explicitly by specifying democracy and natural resources as endogenous
variables in our regressions.
Note that if democracy is endogenous, then the interaction between democracy and
natural resources is also endogenous. We consider two cases. In case 1, only democracy is
treated as endogenous. Thus here, we re-estimate equation (1) where we specify dem and
nat ￿ dem as endogenous variables. In case 2, both democracy and natural resources are
treated as endogenous and therefore the endogenous variables are dem, nat, and nat￿dem.
The results are reported in Table 8. As expected, the introduction of the endogenous variables
increases the instrument count substantially, and as a consequence r is low.16 Columns 1, 2,
16For example the instrument count for the system GMM regressions increases from 82 for the case where
nat and dem are exogenous (Column 4 of Table 3) to 295 when nat and dem are endogenous (Column 6 of
145 and 6 show the results when the number of lags of the variables used in instrumentation is
unrestricted and Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 report the results when the number of instruments
are curtailed. The results hold in both cases: b ￿ and b ￿ are signi￿cant at the 1% level in all
the eight regressions.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the interaction between democracy, natural resources and FDI. We
￿nd that the e⁄ect of democracy on FDI depends on the importance of natural resources in
the host country￿ s exports. Democracy facilitates FDI in countries where the share of natural
resources in total exports is low, but has a negative e⁄ect on FDI in countries where exports
are dominated by natural resources. This result has important implications for countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)￿ many of the countries in the region are in dire need of FDI
(Asiedu, 2004), have weak democracies (Fosu, 2008), and their exports are dominated by
primary commodities (Muehlbeger, 2007).17
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Figures 1a and 1b. FDI and Freedom House Measure of Democracy (Free)  
Figure 1a: Non-natural Resource Exporting Countries (Group 1) 
 
Figure 1b: Natural Resource Exporting Countries (Group 2) 
          
The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, 
a  higher  number  implies  more  democratic  rights.  Non-resource  exporting  countries  (i.e.  Group  1)  comprise  of 
countries  where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports,      ̅̅̅̅̅, is less than 50% and resource 
exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where      ̅̅̅̅̅      . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 
22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting 
countries (figure 1a), but uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries (figure 1b). An OLS regression of  
democracy on FDI for Group 1 countries yielded,   ̂                    , with robust p-value=0.021 and          ; 
and  for  Group  2  countries,    ̂                    ,  robust  p-value=  0.842  and            .  See  Table  A1  in  the 
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Figures 2a and 2b. FDI and Polity IV Measure Democracy (Polity) 
Figure 2a: Non-natural Resource Exporting Countries (Group 1) 
 
Figure 2b: Natural Resource Exporting Countries (Group 2) 
 
The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, 
a  higher  number  implies  more  democratic  rights.  Non-resource  exporting  countries  (i.e.  Group  1)  comprise  of 
countries  where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports,      ̅̅̅̅̅, is less than 50% and resource 
exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where      ̅̅̅̅̅      . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 
22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting 
countries (figure 2a), but uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries (figure 2b). An OLS regression of  
democracy on FDI for Group 1 countries yielded,   ̂                    , with robust p-value=0.038 and          ; 
and  for  Group  2  countries,    ̂                    ,  robust  p-value=  0.972  and            .  See  Table  A1  in  the 
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Figures 3a and 3b. FDI and ICRG Measure of Democracy (ICRG)  
Figure 3a: Non-natural Resource Exporting Countries 
 
Figure 3b: Natural Resource Exporting Countries 
         
The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, 
a  higher  number  implies  more  democratic  rights.  Non-resource  exporting  countries  (i.e.  Group  1)  comprise  of 
countries  where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports,      ̅̅̅̅̅, is less than 50% and resource 
exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where      ̅̅̅̅̅      . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 
22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting 
countries (figure 3a), and negatively uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries (figure 3b). An OLS 
regression  of  democracy  on  FDI  for  Group  1  yielded    ̂                     ,  with  robust  p-value=0.001  and 
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FDI Fitted valuesTable 1: Summary Statistics
Developing Middle Low Sub-Saharan Outside Non
Description Countries Income Income Africa (SSA) SSA Transition
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Free 0.57 0.31 0.63 0.31 0.42 0.27 0.41 0.29 0.63 0.30 0.56 0.31
Polity 0.63 0.32 0.69 0.31 0.51 0.30 0.49 0.30 0.69 0.31 0.62 0.32
Icrg 0.60 0.22 0.63 0.21 0.52 0.21 0.51 0.17 0.62 0.22 0.58 0.21
FDI/GDP (%) 2.85 3.58 3.31 3.94 1.75 2.16 1.84 2.30 3.22 3.88 2.55 3.22
FDI per Capita 5.10 14.11 7.37 16.89 0.64 0.95 1.54 5.54 6.75 16.40 4.88 14.30
Trade/GDP (%) 75.09 37.45 81.84 39.11 58.80 26.91 65.23 29.78 78.65 39.28 72.04 37.08
Investment/GDP (%) 21.19 6.46 22.37 6.37 18.36 5.77 18.27 5.66 22.25 6.40 20.97 6.51
Ln (1+ Phones) 1.80 1.09 2.30 0.87 0.60 0.47 0.73 0.72 2.19 0.94 1.63 1.04
In￿ation (%) 20.65 56.96 22.94 64.91 15.11 29.48 15.75 33.57 22.41 63.25 18.71 54.31
Ln (GDP per capita) 7.10 1.09 7.66 0.73 5.76 0.45 6.12 1.01 7.46 0.87 7.03 1.10
Fuel/Exports (%) 16.67 26.49 19.05 27.36 23.40 27.84 16.15 28.86 16.86 25.61 16.45 27.07
Minerals/Exports (%) 8.35 14.67 6.64 11.14 10.94 23.36 11.60 19.15 7.17 12.49 8.64 15.50
Fuel & Minerals/Exports (%) 25.02 28.14 25.68 28.27 12.47 20.31 27.75 30.81 24.03 27.08 25.08 28.81
Corruption 0.56 0.16 0.55 0.15 0.60 0.15 0.59 0.16 0.56 0.15 0.57 0.15
Law and Order 0.53 0.19 0.55 0.20 0.49 0.17 0.49 0.16 0.55 0.20 0.51 0.19
Bureaucracy 0.55 0.22 0.52 0.21 0.62 0.22 0.62 0.23 0.52 0.21 0.55 0.22
FDI Risk 0.52 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.56 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.51 0.17 0.53 0.16
Con￿ict 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.16
Instability of Government 0.37 0.18 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.37 0.18 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.18
The democracy variables free, polity and icrg are from Freedom House, Polity IV and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), respectively.
The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more democracy. FDI is the net in￿ ows in current US$,
Trade is the sum of imports and exports, in￿ ation is based on the annual CPI, investment=GDP is the share of gross ￿xed capital formation in GDP,
phones is the number telephone lines per 100 people, GDP per capita is in constant 2000 US$, fuel=exports is the share of fuel in total merchandize
exports and minerals=exports is the share of minerals and ore in total merchandize exports. The data are from the World Development Indicators
(2009), published by the World Bank. The data on institutions, FDI risk and political instability are from the ICRG. Corruption re￿ ects the level
of corruption within the political system, law and order measures the e⁄ectiveness of the rule of law, bureaucracy refers to the institutional strength
and quality of the bureaucracy, FDI risk re￿ ects the risk of expropriation and government constraints on pro￿t repatriation, con￿ ict is the average
of internal con￿ ict (such as political violence within the country) and external con￿ ict (such as cross-border con￿ icts), and instability of government
re￿ ects the ability of government to stay in o¢ ce. Similar to the democracy measures, the data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that
a higher number implies more corruption, better law enforcement, higher FDI risk and higher political instability.
21Table 2: The Direct E⁄ect of Democracy on FDI
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
Democracy, dem (b ￿) 1.616*** 1.189*** 3.400*** 1.020*** 1.140*** 3.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.045*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.251*** -0.171*** -0.184*** -0.076*** -0.002 -0.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.771) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.008*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.237*** 0.229*** 0.221*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.237***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1+ Phones) 2.201*** 1.834*** 1.955*** 2.643*** 2.215*** 2.486***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In￿ation -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153)
lgdpc=Ln (GDP per capita) -5.439** -8.464*** -11.494*** -1.961 -3.956*** -1.456
(0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) (0.003) (0.186)
lgdpc￿lgdpc 0.262 0.479*** 0.646*** -0.001 0.202** 0.095
(0.114) (0.000) (0.000) (0.990) (0.021) (0.199)
Constant 17.456* 28.979*** 41.129*** 5.714 10.656** -1.210
(0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.027) (0.767)
Hansen J Test (p-value)1 0.338 0.424 0.376 0.369 0.311 0.651
Serial Correlation Test (p-value)2 0.662 0.527 0.909 0.493 0.477 0.407
Number of Observations 566 541 455 652 614 551
Number of Countries, n 106 98 86 112 102 87
Number of Instruments, i 72 72 69 81 81 78
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.47 1.36 1.25 1.38 1.26 1.12
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No
Notes: P-values in parenthesis.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Free, Polity and Icrg are measures of democracy from
Freedom House, Polity IV and The International Country Risk Guide, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between
zero and one. A higher number implies more democracy.
1The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.
2The null hypothesis is that the errors in the ￿rst di⁄erence regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
22Table 3: The Interaction E⁄ect of Democracy and Natural Resources on FDI
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
Democracy, dem, b ￿ 2.528*** 2.048*** 6.274*** 2.205*** 2.120*** 5.813***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.112*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen J Test (p-value)1 0.320 0.511 0.239 0.414 0.350 0.650
Serial Correlation Test (p-value)2 0.645 0.518 0.900 0.481 0.468 0.650
Number of Observations 566 541 455 652 614 551
Number of Countries, n 106 98 86 112 102 87
Number of Instruments, i 73 73 70 82 82 79
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.45 1.34 1.23 1.37 1.17 1.10
1The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.
2The null hypothesis is that the errors in the ￿rst di⁄erence regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
Table 4: @fdi=@dem = b ￿ + b ￿ ￿ nat, Evaluated at various values of nat
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
Value Percentile Corresponding
of nat of nat Country Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
0.74 10th Mauritius 2.499*** 2.018*** 6.191*** 2.173*** 2.090*** 5.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3.5 25th Thailand 2.390*** 1.906*** 5.883*** 2.054*** 1.976*** 5.417***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
14.4 50th Ukraine 1.961*** 1.464*** 4.664*** 1.582*** 1.582*** 4.184***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
42.5 75th Indonesia 0.855*** 0.325* 1.522*** 0.365*** 0.373*** 1.007***
(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000)
62.4 90th Syria 0.072 -0.482* -0.703 -0.500* -0.445*** -1.243***
(0.833) (0.081) (0.136) (0.072) (0.004) (0.000)
24.9 Mean Belarus 1.55*** 1.037*** 3.486*** 1.126*** 1.095*** 2.994***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: nat is the share of the sum of minerals and fuel in total exports (%), and nat is the average of nat, from 1982-2007.
Table 5: The Interaction E⁄ect of Fuel, Minerals and Democracy on FDI
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
Variables Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
Democracy, dem, b ￿ 2.657*** 1.971*** 6.008*** 2.060*** 2.115*** 5.685***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fe ￿ dem, c ￿1 -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.116*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.101***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
me ￿ dem, c ￿2 -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.120*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.131***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ho : ￿1 = ￿2 (P-values) 0.556 0.470 0.701 0.390 0.252 0.000
Reject H0? No No No No No Yes
23Table 6: Robustness Regressions
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
Variables b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿
Panel A: Sub-Samples
Middle Income Countries, r < 1 3.648*** -0.063*** 3.315*** -0.063***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004)
Middle Income Countries, r > 1 2.620*** -0.026*** 2.440*** -0.032***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004)
Low Income Countries, r < 1 1.035*** -0.053*** 2.763*** -0.030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109)
Low Income Countries, r > 1 0.966*** -0.044*** 2.051*** -0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109)
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), r < 1 -0.471 -0.031 2.744*** -0.078***
(0.782) (0.112) (0.008) (0.000)
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), r > 1 0.799** -0.056*** -0.082 -0.041***
(0.013) (0.000) (0.831) (0.000)
Non-SSA countries 3.052*** -0.019*** 1.802*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Exclude Transition Countries 2.697*** -0.054*** 2.674*** -0.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Sub-Periods
1982-1992 0.884** -0.035*** 1.219*** -0.045***
(0.018) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
1992-2007 2.631*** -0.034*** 1.689*** -0.027***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008)
1970-2007 2.463*** -0.050*** 2.218*** -0.049***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel C: Alternative Measures of Democracy
Principal Component 1.126*** -0.020*** 1.152*** -0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Democracy 5.717*** -0.100*** 5.848*** -0.097***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel D: Time Fixed E⁄ects & Alternative Measure for Dependent Variable
Include Fixed E⁄ects 2.128*** -0.032*** 2.177*** -0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI per Capita 6.355*** -0.196*** 7.130*** -0.207***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
24Table 7: Robustness Regressions. FDI Risk, Institutional Quality and Political Risk
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Include Include Include Include Include Include Include
Variables FDI Institutional Political All FDI Institutional Political All
Risk Quality Risk Variables Risk Quality Risk Variables
dem, b ￿ 3.572*** 3.894*** 3.816*** 3.644*** 3.784*** 4.238*** 4.272*** 4.294***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) v (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI Risk -3.523*** -2.203*** -1.857*** -1.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption 0.974*** 0.064 -0.250 -1.550***
(0.004) (0.855) (0.245) (0.000)
Rule of Law 0.477** 0.541* 0.098 1.357***
(0.044) (0.067) (0.644) (0.000)
Bureaucracy -1.515*** -1.639*** -0.195 -0.490**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.014)
Con￿ict 0.811*** 1.780*** 2.507*** 4.012***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Instability of Government -2.801*** -1.731*** -2.440*** -2.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 455 455 455 455 551 551 551 551
Number of Countries, n 86 86 86 86 87 87 87 87
Number of Instruments, i 71 73 72 76 80 82 81 85
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.21 1.18 1.19 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.07 1.02
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No No No
FDI risk re￿ects the risk of exprorpriation and government contraints on pro￿t repatriation; corruption re￿ects the level of corruption within the political
system; law and order measures the e⁄ectiveness of the rule of law; bureaucracy refers to the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy;
con￿ict is the average of internal con￿ict and external con￿ict; and instability of government re￿ects the ability of government to stay in o¢ ce.
The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more corruption, better law enforcement, higher FDI risk and
more political instability.
25Table 8: Robustness Regressions. Endogenous Democracy and Natural Resources
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat
endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous
dem, b ￿ 3.982*** 2.474*** 3.775*** 3.563*** 1.769*** 1.601*** 1.338*** 1.558***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.092*** -0.062*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.036*** -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.046***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 566 566 566 566 652 652 652 652
Number of Countries, n 106 106 106 106 112 112 112 112
Number of Instruments, i 197 259 89 97 224 295 110 105
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 0.57 0.41 1.19 1.09 0.50 0.38 1.02 1.07
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No Yes, 2 Yes, 2 No No Yes, 8 Yes, 4
Limit the no.of lags of endogenous
variables used in instrumentation? No No No No No No Yes, 2 Yes, 2
26Appendix
Table A1: Countries included in Regressions
In Sub-Saharan Africa Natural Outside Sub-Saharan Africa Natural
Country Code Free Polity Icrg Resource Country Code Free Polity Icrg Resource
Angolaa AGO 0.06 NA 0.37 99.69 Albaniac ALB 0.60 0.77 0.68 11.09
Benin BEN 0.81 0.80 NA 4.75 Algeria DZA 0.18 0.26 0.46 97.00
Botswanaa BWA 0.83 0.95 0.56 8.30 Argentina ARG 0.81 0.88 0.77 16.04
Burkina Faso BFA 0.33 0.33 0.54 1.15 Armeniac ARM 0.44 0.69 0.59 26.12
Burundi BDI 0.31 0.48 NA 1.74 Azerbaijanc AZE 0.17 0.17 0.31 79.35
Cameroona CMR 0.12 0.22 0.41 43.28 Bangladeshb BGD 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.82
Central Afr. Rep. CAF 0.42 0.54 NA 22.07 Barbados BRB 1.00 NA NA 6.80
Congo, Rep.a COG 0.30 0.53 0.58 90.65 Belarusc BLR 0.08 0.15 0.27 24.17
Cote d￿ Ivoire CIV 0.15 0.24 0.41 17.2 Belize BLZ 1.00 NA NA 15.81
Ethiopia ETH 0.34 0.55 0.57 2.18 Bhutanb BTN 0.00 0.00 NA 32.54
Gabona GAB 0.28 0.26 0.51 84.72 Bolivia BOL 0.82 0.93 0.63 63.77
Gambia GMB 0.21 0.23 0.60 1.66 Brazil BRA 0.78 0.83 0.65 13.95
Ghana GHA 0.64 0.60 0.48 16.65 Bulgariac BGR 0.93 0.93 0.85 21.33
Kenya KEN 0.28 0.35 0.56 15.36 Cambodiab CAM 0.17 0.60 NA 0.01
Lesothoa LSO 0.72 0.90 NA 0.05 Chile CHL 0.72 0.75 0.62 52.84
Madagascar MDG 0.59 0.66 0.72 8.44 China CHN 0.02 0.15 0.35 7.50
Malawi MWI 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.20 Colombia COL 0.67 0.88 0.63 31.03
Mali MLI 0.8 0.80 0.56 1.31 Costa Rica CRI 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.71
Mauritaniaa MRT 0.17 0.20 NA 43.2 Croatiac HRV 0.72 0.66 0.78 13.69
Mauritius MUS 0.98 1.00 NA 0.74 Czech Republicc CZE 1.00 1.00 0.87 5.57
Mozambique MOZ 0.67 0.8 0.56 44.56 Dominica DMA 0.92 NA NA 0.95
Niger NER 0.42 0.65 0.59 59.54 Dominican Rep. DOM 0.83 0.83 0.65 2.81
Nigeria NGA 0.28 0.43 0.43 96.48 Ecuador ECU 0.77 0.89 0.67 47.73
Rwanda RWA 0.06 0.26 NA 22.09 Egypt EGY 0.24 0.22 0.53 51.06
Senegal SEN 0.65 0.62 0.62 22.87 El Salvador SLV 0.75 0.83 0.54 5.35
Seychellesa SYC 0.33 NA NA 54.02 Estoniac EST 0.99 0.8 0.84 10.45
Sierra Leone SLE 0.39 0.15 NA 35.99 Fiji FJI 0.48 0.75 NA 0.30
South Africa ZAF 0.80 0.88 0.73 19.94 Georgia GEO 0.58 0.76 NA 28.27
Sudan SDN 0.04 0.17 0.32 31.90 Grenada GRD 0.96 NA NA 0.10
Swaziland SWZ 0.06 0.05 NA 1.06 Guatemala GTM 0.58 0.72 0.56 4.82
Tanzania TZA 0.49 0.53 0.65 9.67 Guyana GUY 0.81 0.80 0.82 14.50
Togo TGO 0.17 0.30 0.27 36.90 Haiti HTI 0.24 0.47 0.24 0.09
Uganda UGA 0.33 0.34 0.37 4.31 Honduras HND 0.73 0.81 0.52 5.49
Zambia ZMB 0.53 0.71 0.67 79.12 Hungary HUN 0.95 0.96 0.89 5.37
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.26 0.31 0.43 16.53 Indiab IND 0.78 0.92 0.75 9.71
The democracy data are normalized so they range from zero to one. A higher number implies more democracy.
Natural resources is the share of fuel and minerals in total merchandize exports (%). All the data are averaged from 1982-2007.
arefers to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that are not low-income.
27Table A1 continued. Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa
Natural Natural
Country Code Free Polity Icrg Resource Country Code Free Polity Icrg Resource
Indonesia IDN 0.41 0.41 0.57 42.45 Papua Guineab PNG 0.83 1.00 0.81 55.09
Iran IRN 0.17 0.46 0.61 83.37 Paraguay PAY 0.58 0.85 0.45 0.67
Jamaica JAM 0.83 0.97 0.71 12.61 Peru PER 0.67 0.79 0.55 54.85
Jordan JOR 0.38 0.29 0.58 27.24 Philippines PHL 0.70 0.78 0.74 7.08
Kazakhstan KAZ 0.17 0.26 0.26 70.10 Polandc POL 0.94 0.90 0.82 13.45
Kyrgyz KGZ 0.31 0.38 NA 22.65 Romaniac ROM 0.75 0.87 0.86 12.74
Iran IRN 0.17 0.46 0.61 83.37 Russian RUS 0.40 0.78 0.56 56.68
Jamaica JAM 0.83 0.97 0.71 12.61 Slovak Repc SVK 0.96 0.93 0.89 8.84
Jordan JOR 0.38 0.29 0.58 27.24 Sri Lanka LKA 0.61 0.75 0.71 3.47
Kazakhstanc KAZ 0.17 0.26 0.26 70.10 St. Kitts KAN 0.99 NA NA 0.03
Kyrgyzc KGZ 0.31 0.38 NA 22.65 St. Lucia LCA 1.00 NA NA 0.03
Latvia LAV 0.94 0.90 0.83 6.54 St. Vincent VCT 0.83 NA NA 0.07
Lithuaniac LTU 0.99 1.00 0.88 21.85 Syrian SYR 0.04 0.08 0.25 62.42
Malaysia MYS 0.47 0.67 0.68 16.91 Thailand THA 0.62 0.75 0.58 3.55
Mexico MEX 0.66 0.66 0.77 28.04 Trinidad TTO 0.92 0.96 0.52 63.30
Moldova MDA 0.70 0.88 0.80 2.91 Tunisia TUN 0.21 0.26 0.42 19.83
Mongoliab MNG 0.83 0.99 0.68 52.09 Turkey TUR 0.62 0.85 0.73 5.23
Morocco MAR 0.38 0.15 0.49 17.51 Ukrainec UKR 0.61 0.83 0.65 14.38
Nepal NPL 0.57 0.53 NA 1.31 Uruguay URY 0.91 0.90 0.72 1.68
Nicaragua NIC 0.67 0.91 1.00 2.55 Vanuatu VUT 0.94 NA NA 0.06
Oman OMN 0.17 0.08 0.17 84.84 Venezuela VEN 0.76 0.88 0.76 88.39
Pakistanb PAK 0.35 0.52 0.31 2.26 Vietnamb VNM 0.00 0.15 0.14 22.15
Panama PAN 0.70 0.74 0.65 5.54 Yemenb YEM 0.31 0.40 0.65 78.86
brefers to countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa that are low-income and crefers to transition countries.
28Studies on the E⁄ect of Democracy on FDI
Year No of Period Measure of Estimation Estimated
Author Published Countries of Study Democracy Procedure E⁄ect
Oneal 1994 48 1950-1985 Polity OLS Insigni￿cant
Rodrik 1996 40 1982-1989 Freedom House OLS Positive
Alesina & Dollar 2000 124 1970-1994 Freedom House OLS Insigni￿cant
Polity
Harms & Ursprung 2002 124 1989-1997 Freedom House OLS Positive
Fixed E⁄ects
Li & Resnick 2003 62 1982-1995 Polity OLS Negative
Fixed E⁄ects
Jensen 2003 114 1970-1997 Polity OLS Positive
Fixed E⁄ects




Jakobsen 2006 96 1983-2001 Freedom House OLS Positive
Polity
Jakobsen & de Soysa 2006 99 1984-2001 Polity OLS Positive
Adam & Fillippaios 2007 105 1989-1997 Freedom House Fixed E⁄ects Positive
Busse & Hefeker 2007 83 1983-2003 International Fixed E⁄ects Positive
Country Risk Dynamic Panel
Guide (ICRG) (Arrelano-Bond)
Buthe & Milner 2008 129 1970-2000 Freedom House Fixed E⁄ects Insigni￿cant
1Table 1: The Interaction E⁄ect of Democracy and Natural Resources on FDI
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
Democracy, dem, b ￿ 2.528*** 2.048*** 6.274*** 2.205*** 2.120*** 5.813***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.011 -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.026***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.112*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other variables
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.251*** -0.184*** -0.218*** -0.082*** -0.018*** -0.117***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.007*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.236*** 0.226*** 0.219*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.227***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + Phones) 2.151*** 1.760*** 1.927*** 2.523*** 2.132*** 2.417***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In￿ation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.171)
lgdpc=Ln (GDP per capita) -4.276 -7.847*** -11.044*** -0.154 -3.812*** -2.864**
(0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.915) (0.000) (0.014)
lgdpc￿lgdpc 0.195 0.466*** 0.605*** -0.107 0.209*** 0.185**
(0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.270) (0.009) (0.020)
Constant 12.507 24.950*** 38.663*** -1.846 9.007** 2.614
(0.209) (0.000) (0.000) (0.727) (0.043) (0.546)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.320 0.511 0.239 0.414 0.350 0.650
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.645 0.518 0.900 0.481 0.468 0.650
Number of Observations 566 541 455 652 614 551
Number of Countries, n 106 98 86 112 102 87
Number of Instruments, i 73 73 70 82 82 79
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.45 1.34 1.23 1.37 1.17 1.10
Limit the no of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No
1Table 2: The Interaction E⁄ect of Fuel, Minerals and Democracy on FDI
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Free Polity Icrg Free Polity Icrg
Democracy, dem, b ￿ 2.657*** 1.971*** 6.008*** 2.060*** 2.115*** 5.685***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fuel and Oil, fe -0.026*** -0.038*** 0.003 -0.020*** -0.023*** 0.014**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.720) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Minerals, me 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.008 0.023*** 0.063***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.253) (0.000) (0.000)
fe ￿ dem, c ￿1 -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.116*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.101***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
me ￿ dem, c ￿2 -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.120*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.131***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ho : ￿1 = ￿2 (P-values) 0.556 0.470 0.701 0.390 0.252 0.000
Reject H0? No No No No No Yes
Other variables
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.237*** -0.175*** -0.208*** -0.072*** -0.006 -0.106***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.008*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.237*** 0.229*** 0.221*** 0.247*** 0.257*** 0.226***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + Phones) 2.213*** 1.845*** 2.137*** 2.601*** 2.210*** 2.468***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In￿ation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036)
lgdpc=Ln (GDP per capita) -6.880*** -8.965*** -13.550*** -0.420 -4.346*** -3.406***
(0.005) (0.000) (0) (0.761) (0.000) (0.001)
lgdpc￿lgdpc 0.345** 0.516*** 0.770*** -0.103 0.236*** 0.216***
(0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.275) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 22.996*** 30.123*** 47.444*** -0.305 10.919*** 4.561
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.951) (0.006) (0.238)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.245 0.438 0.387 0.438 0.319 0.519
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.617 0.491 0.803 0.463 0.455 0.625
Number of Observations 566 541 455 652 614 551
Number of Countries, n 106 98 86 112 102 87
Number of Instruments, i 75 75 72 84 84 81
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.41 1.31 1.19 1.33 1.21 1.07
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No
2Table 3: Robustness Regressions. Subsamples: Di⁄erence GMM
Outside Outside Middle Income Low Income SSA
Variables Transition SSA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dem, b ￿ 2.697*** 3.052*** 3.648*** 2.620*** 1.035*** 0.966*** -0.471 0.799**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.782) (0.013)
Natural Resources, nat -0.023*** -0.061*** 0.009*** -0.012 -0.035*** -0.023** 0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.167) (0.000) (0.030) (0.681) (0.942)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.054*** -0.019*** -0.063*** -0.026*** -0.053*** -0.044*** -0.031 -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000)
Lagged FDI/GDP 0.083*** -0.291*** -0.305*** -0.287*** 0.042** -0.017** 0.403*** 0.396***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.031*** -0.013* 0.010** 0.010 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.047) (0.219) (0.000)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -2.821* -22.072*** -19.443*** -14.881*** 32.744*** 9.082 0.680 3.996
(0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.270) (0.934) (0.281)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 0.226** 1.327*** 1.073*** 0.794*** -2.528*** -0.624 -0.005 -0.282
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.376) (0.994) (0.358)
In￿ation -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.354) (0.155) (0.027) (0.020)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.135*** 0.299*** 0.319*** 0.330*** 0.044*** 0.017* 0.048** 0.025**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.059) (0.013) (0.029)
Ln (1 + phones) 1.043*** 2.089*** 2.650*** 2.056*** 1.586*** 2.341*** -0.099 1.719***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.937) (0.000)
Constant 4.941 80.513*** 72.586*** 55.274*** -102.998*** -31.894 -3.701 -15.334
(0.349) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.179) (0.883) (0.168)
Hansen J Test (p-value)1 0.198 0.343 0.364 0.190 1.000 0.400 1.000 0.302
Serial Correlation Test (p-value)2 0.105 0.753 0.768 0.777 0.750 0.657 0.192 0.146
Number of Observations 504 427 409 409 157 157 139 139
Number of Countries, n 90 76 72 72 34 34 30 30
Number of Instruments, i 73 73 73 52 71 28 72 28
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.23 1.04 0.99 1.38 0.48 1.21 0.42 1.07
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No 5 No 2 No 2
3Table 4: Robustness Regressions. Subsamples: System GMM
Outside Outside SSA Middle Income Low Income SSA
Transition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
dem, b ￿ 2.674*** 2.070*** 1.802*** 3.315*** 2.440*** 2.763*** 2.051*** 2.744*** -0.082
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.831)
Natural Resources, nat -0.014*** -0.036*** -0.041*** 0.036*** 0.028*** -0.040*** -0.044*** 0.011** 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.392)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.075*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.063*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.010 -0.078*** -0.041***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged FDI/GDP 0.129*** -0.099*** -0.068*** -0.138*** -0.091*** 0.219*** 0.195*** 0.594*** 0.677***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.004 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.636) (0.000) (0.001) (0.286)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -1.285* -16.980*** -18.777*** -15.603*** -14.004*** -0.651*** -10.134*** 6.290* 2.409
(0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.098) (0.266)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 0.158*** 0.941*** 1.069*** 0.735*** 0.615*** 0.145*** 0.857*** -0.469* -0.212
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.180)
In￿ation -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.506) (0.187)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.132*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.342*** 0.362*** -0.011 -0.022*** 0.070*** 0.078***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 0.992*** 2.526*** 2.140*** 3.043*** 2.647*** 0.752*** 1.506*** 0.262 0.448
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.589) (0.373)
Constant -2.022 62.580*** 69.858*** 60.481*** 55.644*** 0.000 29.591*** -22.282* -7.744
(0.480) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) N/A (0.000) (0.0889) (0.264)
Hansen J Test (p-value)1 0.259 0.473 0.507 0.671 0.422 N/A 0.392 1.000 0.647
Serial Correlation Test (p-value)2 0.146 0.544 0.537 0.520 0.494 N/A 0.510 0.173 0.253
Number of Observations 574 479 479 461 461 191 191 173 173
Number of Countries, n 96 77 77 75 75 37 37 35 35
Number of Instruments, i 82 82 72 82 54 80 37 81 28
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.17 0.94 1.07 0.91 1.39 0.46 1.00 0.43 1.25
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No Yes, 7 No Yes, 4 No Yes, 2 No Yes, 1
4Table 5: Robustness Regressions. FDI Risk, Institutional Quality and Political Risk
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Include Include Include Include Include Include Include
VARIABLES FDI Institutional Political All FDI Institutional Political All
Restrictions Quality Risk Variables Restrictions Quality Risk Variables
dem, b ￿ 3.572*** 3.894*** 3.816*** 3.644*** 3.784*** 4.238*** 4.272*** 4.294***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.005**
(0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.495) (0.269) (0.833) (0.708) (0.034)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.270*** -0.235*** -0.236*** -0.297*** -0.135*** -0.118*** -0.126*** -0.152***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.016*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.310)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -7.976*** -9.897*** -9.818*** -10.119*** 0.166 -1.595** -1.525* -2.839**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.873) (0.038) (0.059) (0.034)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 0.376*** 0.577*** 0.584*** 0.555*** -0.007 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.235***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
in￿ation -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000* 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.800) (0.073) (0.044) (0.935)
Fixed investment/GDP 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.225*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 0.228*** 0.233*** 0.225***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 1.797*** 1.883*** 1.613*** 1.649*** 2.290*** 2.384*** 2.085*** 2.140***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI Restrictions -3.523*** -2.203*** -1.857*** -1.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption 0.974*** 0.064 -0.250 -1.550***
(0.004) (0.855) (0.245) (0.000)
Rule of Law 0.477** 0.541* 0.098 1.357***
(0.044) (0.067) (0.644) (0.000)
Bureaucracy -1.515*** -1.639*** -0.195 -0.490**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.014)
Con￿ict 0.811*** 1.780*** 2.507*** 4.012***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Instability of Government -2.801*** -1.731*** -2.440*** -2.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 32.425*** 33.507*** 34.114*** 38.766*** -6.473* -2.501 -3.459 1.817
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.388) (0.300) (0.725)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.381 0.525 0.281 0.359 0.504 0.341 0.269 0.370
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.947 0.812 0.807 0.961 0.627 0.591 0.626 0.643
Number of Observations 455 455 455 455 551 551 551 551
Number of Countries, n 86 86 86 86 87 87 87 87
Number of Instruments, i 71 73 72 76 80 82 81 85
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.21 1.18 1.19 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.07 1.02
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No No No
5Table 6: Robustness Regressions. Sub-Periods
Di⁄erence GMM Systems GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1982-1992 1992-2007 1970-2007 1982-1992 1992-2007 1970-2007
dem, b ￿ 0.884** 2.631*** 2.463*** 1.219*** 1.689*** 2.218***
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat 0.008 -0.022** -0.009 0.010 -0.020** -0.012***
(0.372) (0.021) (0.111) (0.202) (0.013) (0.004)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.027*** -0.049***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
Other Variables
Lagged FDI/GDP 0.172*** -0.248*** -0.192*** 0.290*** -0.099*** -0.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) 6.023 -4.965 -2.151 7.480* 6.149** 0.964
(0.144) (0.271) (0.324) (0.069) (0.024) (0.434)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc -0.544* 0.234 0.042 -0.704** -0.499*** -0.195**
(0.070) (0.432) (0.768) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019)
In￿ation -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Investment/GDP 0.095*** 0.264*** 0.198*** 0.135*** 0.272*** 0.214***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 1.445*** 2.040*** 1.862*** 1.456*** 2.367*** 2.388***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -19.673 14.877 6.378 -22.264 -26.205*** -4.506
(0.172) (0.378) (0.440) (0.125) (0.010) (0.310)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.072 0.123 0.325 0.234 0.237 0.563
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.177 0.636 0.586 0.221 0.406 0.471
Number of Observations 179 435 633 213 504 771
Number of Countries, n 57 105 107 73 111 113
Number of Instruments, i 28 61 76 32 60 87
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 2.04 1.72 1.41 2.28 1.85 1.30
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No No No
6Table 7: Robustness Regressions. Alternative Measures of Democracy
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Principal Average Principal Average
Componet Democracy Component Democracy
dem, b ￿ 1.126*** 5.717*** 1.152*** 5.848***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat -0.056*** 0.005 -0.049*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.457) (0.000) (0.002)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.020*** -0.100*** -0.019*** -0.097***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other variables
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.220*** -0.217*** -0.098*** -0.095***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -10.494*** -10.469*** -0.932 -1.049
(0.000) (0.000) (0.307) (0.252)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 0.614*** 0.614*** 0.099* 0.107*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.073)
in￿ation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.104) (0.066)
Fixed investment/GDP 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.240*** 0.241***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 1.829*** 1.848*** 2.093*** 2.115***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 38.072*** 34.384*** -2.748 -5.922*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.430) (0.092)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.448 0.464 0.320 0.339
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.774 0.769 0.597 0.593
Number of Observations 452 452 547 547
Number of Countries, n 86 86 86 86
Number of Instruments, i 70 70 79 79
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.23 1.23 1.09 1.09
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No
7Table 8: Robustness Regressions. Time Fixed E⁄ects and FDI per Capita as Dependent Variables
FDI Per Capita Time Fixed E⁄ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Di⁄erence System Di⁄erence System
dem, b ￿ 6.355*** 7.130*** 2.128*** 2.177***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat 0.021*** 0.028*** -0.027*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.196*** -0.207*** -0.032*** -0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.280*** -0.073***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP 0.022*** 0.058*** 0.017*** 0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -85.243*** -78.318*** -3.597 0.256
(0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.851)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 6.378*** 5.597*** 0.007 -0.142
(0.000) (0.000) (0.969) (0.122)
in￿ation -0.002** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.028) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed investment/GDP 0.427*** 0.534*** 0.250*** 0.265***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 3.194*** 6.085*** 0.373 1.520***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.178) (0.000)
Time Fixed E⁄ect Yes Yes
L.fdinpop_10 0.133*** 0.324***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 264.588*** 244.335*** 18.720* -2.441
(0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.613)
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.104 0.214 0.190 0.197
Serial Correlation Test (p-value) 0.199 0.192 0.762 0.524
Number of Observations 434 520 566 652
Number of Countries, n 97 107 106 112
Number of Instruments, i 73 82 82 91
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.33 1.30 1.29 1.23
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No No No
8Table 9: Robustness Regressions. Endogenous Democracy and Natural Resources
Di⁄erence GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat dem is dem & nat
endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous
dem, b ￿ 3.982*** 2.474*** 3.775*** 3.563*** 1.769*** 1.601*** 1.338*** 1.558***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Resources, nat -0.007*** -0.026*** 0.008 0.014*** 0.001 0.019*** -0.001 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.158) (0.000) (0.337) (0.000) (0.548) (0.000)
nat ￿ dem, b ￿ -0.092*** -0.062*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.036*** -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.046***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other Variables
Lagged FDI/GDP -0.111*** -0.103*** -0.161*** -0.177*** -0.014*** 0.006*** -0.034*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.518)
Trade/GDP 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069)
lgdpc = Ln (GDP per capita) -14.905*** -15.124*** -8.711*** -11.832*** -3.363*** -5.916*** -1.122*** -3.704***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
lgdpc ￿ lgdpc 0.993*** 0.998*** 0.505*** 0.716*** 0.199*** 0.341*** 0.005 0.156***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.848) (0.000)
in￿ation -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed investment/GDP 0.226*** 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.239*** 0.243***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (1 + phones) 1.192*** 1.420*** 1.656*** 1.785*** 1.806*** 2.091*** 2.163*** 2.333***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 47.765*** 49.916*** 27.768*** 38.964*** 7.376*** 17.842*** 0.580 10.718***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.703) (0.000)
Hansen J Test (p-value)1 1.000 1.000 0.472 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.526 0.322
Serial Correlation Test (p-value)2 0.561 0.535 0.577 0.598 0.465 0.448 0.474 0.458
Number of Observations 566 566 566 566 652 652 652 652
Number of Countries, n 106 106 106 106 112 112 112 112
Number of Instruments, i 197 259 89 97 224 295 110 105
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 0.57 0.41 1.19 1.09 0.50 0.38 1.02 1.07
Limit the no.of lags of dependent
variable used in instrumentation? No No Yes, 2 Yes, 2 No No Yes, 8 Yes, 4
Limit the no.of lags of endogenous
variables used in instrumentation? No No No No No No Yes, 2 Yes, 2
9